@article {10.2139/ssrn.2959844,
	title = {Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies},
	journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
	year = {2019},
	abstract = {We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about undersaving for retirement and income inequality. Agents differ in present bias and earnings ability, both unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using realistic policy instruments: mandatory savings at low incomes but a choice between subsidized savings vehicles at high incomes{\textendash}resembling Social Security, 401(k) and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more savings choice at higher incomes facilitates redistribution. To solve large-scale versions of this problem numerically, we propose a general, computationally stable, and efficient active-set algorithm. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find significant welfare gains from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes.},
	keywords = {Economic behaviors, Fathers, Paternal support, Policy, policy effects, Saving},
	doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2959844},
	author = {Moser, Christian and Silva, Pedro Olea de Souza e}
}
