@article {8012,
	title = {The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study},
	journal = {Social Security Bulletin},
	volume = {74},
	year = {2014},
	note = {Date revised - 2015-04-01 Availability -  URL:http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/  Publisher{\textquoteright}s URL},
	pages = {55-69},
	publisher = {74},
	abstract = {This article uses Health and Retirement Study data to investigate the effects of Social Security{\textquoteright}s Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and Government Pension Offset (GPO) on Social Security benefits received by households. The provisions reduce benefits for individuals or the dependents of individuals whose work histories include jobs for which they were entitled to a pension and were not subject to Social Security payroll taxes ( noncovered  employment). We find that about 3.5 percent of households are subject to either the WEP or the GPO, and that the provisions reduce the present value of their Social Security benefits by roughly one-fifth. Households affected by both provisions experience benefit reductions of about one-third. Under the WEP, the Social Security benefit reduction is capped at one-half of the amount of the pension from noncovered employment, which substantially reduces the WEP penalty and prevents the WEP adjustment from falling disproportionately on households in the lowest earnings category.},
	keywords = {Employment and Labor Force, Income, Pensions, Public Policy, Retirement Planning and Satisfaction, Social Security},
	author = {Alan L Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier and N. Tabatabai}
}
@article {6906,
	title = {Social Security, Pensions and Retirement Behaviour Within the Family},
	journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics},
	volume = {19},
	year = {2004},
	note = {RDA 1996-005; HRS 1992},
	pages = {723-737},
	publisher = {19},
	abstract = {This paper estimates a structural model of family retirement using US data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). It provides further insight into household retirement decision making and the reasons for interdependence in the retirement decisions of each spouse. Improvements in HRS data and matched employer provided pension histories allow more precise identification of key parameters governing interdependent behaviour within the household. In an earlier study we found that interdependence was due to preferences rather than coordination of retirement incentives in the budget, and in particular that it is not a correlation in preferences, but the appearance of the spouse{\textquoteright}s retirement status in the husband{\textquoteright}s and wife{\textquoteright}s utility function that is largely responsible for coordination of retirement between spouses. We now find that a measure of how much each spouse values being able to spend time in retirement with the other accounts for a good portion of that apparent interdependence. For the wife, the husband{\textquoteright}s retirement status influences her retirement decision only if she values spending time in retirement with her husband. For husbands, the effect of having the wife already retired on his retirement decision is roughly doubled if he enjoys spending time in retirement with his wife, but there is some effect even if he does not. This is consistent with our earlier findings that the husband is more influenced by having a retired spouse than the wife is. The increase in the extent of the dependence of the wife{\textquoteright}s labour supply on the husband{\textquoteright}s retirement from our past work probably is traceable to better measurement of the opportunity set facing the husband in HRS data. Once estimated, we use the model to investigate the labour supply effects of alternative social security policies, examining the effect of dividing credit for earnings evenly between spouses, or of basing social security benefits on the amounts accumulated in private accounts. Both policies change the relative importance of spouse and survivor social security benefits within the household and both raise the relative reward to work later in the life cycle. The incentives created are modest, and retirement responds accordingly. Nevertheless, at some ages, such as 65, there may be as much as a 6  increase in the old age work force under privatized accounts. Copyright   2004 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.},
	keywords = {Adult children, Pensions, Retirement Planning and Satisfaction, Social Security},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.753},
	author = {Alan L Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier}
}
@article {5572,
	title = {Searching for Better Prospects: Endogenizing Falling Job Tenure and Private Pension Coverage},
	number = {2003-038E},
	year = {2003},
	institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis},
	address = {St. Louis},
	abstract = {Recent declines in job tenure have coincided with a shift away from traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions, which reward long tenure. New evidence also points to an increase in job-to-job movements by workers, and we document gains in relative wages of job-to-job movers over a similar period. We develop a search model in which firms may offer tenure-based contracts like DB pensions to reduce the incidence of costly on-the-job search by workers. Either reduced search costs or an increase in the probability of job matches can, under fairly general conditions, lower the value of deterring search and the use of DB pensions.},
	keywords = {Contracts, Job tenure, Pensions},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.896546},
	author = {Friedberg, Leora and Owyang, Michael T. and Sinclair, T.}
}
@inbook {5156,
	title = {Social Security Benefits of Immigrants and U.S. Born},
	booktitle = {Issues in the Economics of Immigration},
	year = {2000},
	note = {RDA 1996-005 ProCite field 8 : ed.},
	pages = {309-350},
	publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
	organization = {University of Chicago Press},
	abstract = {Immigrants realize higher Social Security benefits per year worked in the U.S. then U.S. born, even when earnings are identical in all years the immigrant has been in the U.S. The benefit formula favors those with low lifetime covered earnings, and the years prior to immigration are treated as years of zero earnings. If instead earnings were averaged only over years of residence in the U.S., and benefits were prorated based on the share of a 35 or 40 year base period spent in residence, immigrants would receive the same return on their social security taxes as U.S. born. For a sample from the Health and Retirement Study, a group born between 1931 and 1941, prorating reduces immigrants{\textquoteright} social security benefits by 7 to 15 percent. For immigrants who entered in the 1980{\textquoteright}s, the reductions would be over 30 percent. Prorating would reduce the present value of benefit payments to immigrants born from 1932 to 1941 by  7.5 billion to  15 billion. Most immigrants will still pay slightly more in taxes than they will receive in benefits. Taxes received from immigrants who subsequently emigrate without collecting benefits tip the balance in favor of including immigrants.},
	keywords = {Consumption and Savings, Demographics, Employment and Labor Force, Pensions, Public Policy, Retirement Planning and Satisfaction, Social Security},
	doi = {10.3386/w6478},
	author = {Alan L Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier},
	editor = {Borjas, George}
}
@inbook {5170,
	title = {Social Security Earnings and Projected Benefits},
	booktitle = {Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {327-359},
	publisher = {Univ. of Pennsylvania Press},
	organization = {Univ. of Pennsylvania Press},
	address = {Philadelphia},
	keywords = {Pensions, Social Security},
	author = {Olivia S. Mitchell and Olson, Jan and Thomas L. Steinmeier},
	editor = {Olivia S. Mitchell and Hammond, B. and Rappaport, A.}
}
