@conference {11348,
	title = {Social Security Eligibility Age and the Health Outcomes and Health Behaviors of the Elderly},
	booktitle = {113th Annual Conference on Taxation},
	year = {2020},
	publisher = {National Tax Association},
	organization = {National Tax Association},
	abstract = {I use a regression discontinuity design to investigate the causal relationship between Social
Security eligibility age and the health outcomes and health behaviors of elderly individuals.
Specifically, I examine changes when individuals attain the Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) of
62. Given the aging of the U.S. population and the heated debate about whether the EEA should
be increased to solve Social Security{\textquoteright}s fiscal imbalance problem, understanding such a
relationship is important. I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore
this relationship. I find that at the EEA, the probability of receiving Social Security benefits
increases by over 30 percentage points. However, there is no evidence that the EEA impacts
health. This finding coincides with the idea that health is a stock, the change in which is slow.
There is little evidence that the EEA influences mental health. I also show suggestive evidence
that when people reach the EEA, they reduce their smoking. I find that males drink more
frequently when they reach the EEA. Retirement might be one of the main mechanisms behind
the changes in health behaviors. },
	keywords = {health, Health Behavior, Social Security, Social Security Benefits, Social Security Eligibility},
	url = {https://nta.confex.com/nta/2020/meetingapp.cgi/Paper/3775},
	author = {Jun Hyun Yun}
}
@article {10774,
	title = {Adjusting Social Security for Increasing Life Expectancy: Effects on Progressivity},
	number = {WP$\#$2010-9},
	year = {2010},
	institution = {Center for Retirement Research at Boston College},
	address = {Boston, MA},
	abstract = {Achieving long-run Social Security solvency requires addressing rising life expectancy.  Increasing the Full Retirement Age (FRA), while holding the Early Entitlement Age (EEA) fixed, could be effective but eventually will result in replacement rates that are viewed by many as too low.  A possible policy to prop up replacement rates is to raise the EEA, which has been age 62 for more than 40 years.  However, an increase in the EEA introduces unfairness because the variation in life expectancy across socioeconomic groups is positively correlated with lifetime income.  Using data from the Health and Retirement Study to investigate how earnings relate to mortality risk and health limitations, this project explores the possibility of constructing a flexible FRA that could preserve or even enhance the progressivity of Social Security benefits.  If life expectancy were correlated with lifetime income, Social Security policy could use the AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) to target policies that are more equitable for people with both lower lifetime income and lower life expectancy.

},
	keywords = {Life Expectancy, Social Security, Social Security Eligibility},
	url = {https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/adjusting-social-security-for-increasing-life-expectancy-effects-on-progressivity/},
	author = {Natalia A. Zhivan and Courtney Monk and John A. Turner}
}
@article {10771,
	title = {An {\textquoteright}Elastic{\textquoteright} Earliest Eligibility Age for Social Security},
	number = {IB$\#$8-2},
	year = {2008},
	institution = {Center for Retirement Research at Boston College},
	abstract = {In the early 1980s, Congress responded to the Social Security program{\textquoteright}s long-term financing shortfall, in part, by raising the Full Retirement Age (FRA) from 65 to 67.  When fully phased in, for those who turn 62 in 2022, workers will have to wait an additional two years to get the same monthly benefit.  If they do not postpone claiming, the increase in the FRA will cut their benefits by about 13 percent.

Congress did not change the earliest age at which workers can claim.  This Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) remains 62.  When the increase in the FRA is fully phased in, workers who claim at 62 will get 70 percent, rather than 80 percent, of their FRA benefit.  This has raised concerns that benefits claimed at the EEA will be too low, especially as retirees age and other sources of income decline.  One response would be to raise the EEA from 62 to 64, in line with the two-year rise in the FRA.

There are, however, two important objections to an increase in the EEA.  The primary concern is that it would create hardship for those unable to work or find employment and who lack the resources to support themselves without working until age 64.  A second objection is that raising the EEA is unfair to disadvantaged groups with low life expectancy.  This brief addresses these concerns by considering an {\textquotedblleft}Elastic{\textquotedblright} EEA, which gives different workers different earliest eligibility ages.},
	keywords = {Social Security, Social Security Eligibility},
	url = {https://crr.bc.edu/briefs/an-qelasticq-earliest-eligibility-age-for-social-security/},
	author = {Haverstick, Kelly and Margarita Sapozhnikov and Natalia A. Zhivan and Sass, Steven A.}
}
@article {10770,
	title = {A New Approach to Raising Social Security{\textquoteright}s Earliest Eligibility Age.},
	number = {WP$\#$2007-19},
	year = {2007},
	institution = {Center for Retirement Research at Boston College},
	address = {Boston},
	abstract = {While Social Security{\textquoteright}s Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is increasing to 67, the Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) remains at 62.  Similar plans to increase the EEA raise concerns that they would create excessive hardship on workers that are worn-out or in bad health.  One simple rule to increase the EEA is to tie an increase to the number of quarters of covered earnings.  Such a provision would allow those with long worklives {\textemdash} presumably the less educated and lower paid {\textemdash} to quit earlier.  We provide evidence that this simple rule would not satisfy the goal of preventing undue hardship on certain workers.  Thus, this paper considers an alternative policy that ties an increase in the EEA to individuals{\textquoteright} Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).  We show that allowing workers with low AIME to continue to be eligible to receive benefits at age 62 has promise as a policy to protect workers who have low earnings and are in poor health from hardship associated with an increase in the EEA.},
	keywords = {Social Security, Social Security Eligibility},
	url = {https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/a-new-approach-to-raising-social-securitys-earliest-eligibility-age/},
	author = {Triest, Robert K. and Haverstick, Kelly and Margarita Sapozhnikov and Natalia A. Zhivan}
}
