TY - CHAP T1 - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States T2 - Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World Y1 - 2010 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan ED - Gruber, Jonathan ED - David A Wise KW - Other KW - Public Policy KW - Social Security JF - Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World T3 - A National Bureau of Economic Research conference report PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago U4 - social security/OASDI/earnings and Benefits File/actuarial reform/common reform/social security wealth JO - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Future Social Security Entitlements and the Retirement Decision JF - Review of Economics and Statistics Y1 - 2007 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Methodology KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect retirement behavior. We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male retirement. We implement forward-looking models whereby individuals consider the incentives to work in all future years. We find that forwardlooking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of retirement. We also find that private pension incentives have roughly similar effects. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies that increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the labor force exit rate of older workers. PB - 89 VL - 89 IS - 2 U4 - Retirement planning/Labor Supply/Social Security Research/Social Security benefit claiming/Entitlements ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States Y1 - 2003 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Social Security is the largest social insurance program in the U.S., and has been shown to be a major determinant of the labor supply decisions of older workers. As such, reforming the Social Security system can have two fiscal impacts: a mechanical effect through changing the rules on benefits entitlements or taxation, and a behavioral effect through individual responses to these changes in benefits or taxes. We build a simulation model that computes these effects for major reforms to the system, building on estimated retirement responses to changing net Social Security entitlements. We then estimate the fiscal impact of reform for the 1931-1941 cohort of workers represented by the Health and Retirement Survey. We find that raising the early and normal retirement age by three years would reduce net costs for this cohort by roughly 30 , and that moving to a much higher benefit level would raise net costs by roughly 55 . Importantly, we find that in both cases the behavioral impacts on net costs are relatively small, at most one-third, and generally less than one-fifth of the total. The reason for these small effects is that the U.S. Social Security system is roughly actuarially fair, so that delaying or inducing retirement has relatively little impact on system balances; most of the effects that do arise are due to changes in general income and consumption taxes. JF - Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Working Papers PB - Center for Retirement Research at Boston College CY - Boston UR - https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/fiscal-effects-of-social-security-reform-in-the-united-states/ N1 - RDA U4 - Retirement Behavior/Public Policy/Social Security ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Delays in Claiming Social Security Benefits JF - Journal of Public Economics Y1 - 2002 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Diamond, Peter A1 - Gruber, Jonathan A1 - Jousten, Alain KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper focuses on Social Security benefit claiming behavior, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using financial calculations and simulations based on an expected utility maximization model, we show that delaying benefit claim for a period of time after retirement is optimal in a wide variety of cases and that gains from delay may be significant. We find that approximately 10 of men retiring before their 62nd birthday delay claiming for at least one year after eligibility. We estimate hazard and probit models using data from the New Beneficiary Data System to test four cross-sectional predictions. While the data suggest that too few men delay, we find that the pattern of delays by early retirees is generally consistent with the hypotheses generated by our theoretical model. PB - 84 VL - 84 UR - http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pdiamond/files/claim14.pdf IS - 3 U4 - Social Security benefit claiming/Claiming behavior/Claiming behavior/retirement planning ER - TY - Generic T1 - An evaluation of the retirement questions in the Health and Retirement Study Y1 - 2002 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Health Insurance KW - Pensions KW - Retirement KW - Social Security PB - National Institute on Aging CY - Bethesda, MD ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Social Security and Retirement Y1 - 2000 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect retirement behavior. We use the wealth of new data available through the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male retirement. We implement forward-looking models of retirement whereby individuals consider not just the incentives to work in the next year but in all future years as well. We find that such forward looking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of retirement decisions. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies which increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the exit rate of older workers from the labor force. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge U4 - Retirement/Social Security ER -