TY - JOUR T1 - The Affordable Care Act as retiree health insurance: implications for retirement and Social Security claiming JF - Journal of Pension Economics and Finance Y1 - 2019 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Affordable Care Act KW - Pensions KW - Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper investigates the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on retirement. The first part of the paper is a difference-in-difference analysis of changes in retirement (and retirement expectations) before and after adoption of the ACA. We find no statistically significant evidence that ACA increased the propensity to retire or changed retirement expectations. The second part of the analysis is based on a structural retirement model. For those age 50 at the time ACA was introduced, the overall reduction in full-time work over the age span 54–65 is simulated to be about 0.1 percentage points. Data are from the Health and Retirement Study. VL - 18 UR - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-pension-economics-and-finance/article/affordable-care-act-as-retiree-health-insurance-implications-for-retirement-and-social-security-claiming/24601D49E42B0714381FC2B9F4D55D10 IS - 3 JO - Journal of Pension Economics and Finance ER - TY - RPRT T1 - The Affordable Care Act as Retiree Health Insurance: Implications for Retirement and Social Security Claiming Y1 - 2016 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Affordable Care Act KW - Health Insurance KW - Older Adults KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we examine the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on retirement. We first calculate retirements (and in related analyses changes in expected ages of retirement and/or Social Security claiming) between 2010, before ACA, and 2014, after ACA, for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement. This group experienced the sharpest change in retirement incentives from ACA. We then compare retirement measures for those with health insurance at work but not in retirement with retirement measures for two other groups, those who, before ACA, had employer provided health insurance both at work and in retirement, and those who had no health insurance either at work or in retirement. To complete a difference-in-difference analysis, we make the same calculations for members of an older cohort over the same age span. We find no evidence that ACA increases the propensity to retire or changes the retirement expectations of those who, before ACA, had coverage when working but not when retired. JF - NBER Working Paper Series PB - National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w22815.pdf ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Distributional Effects of Means Testing Social Security: An Exploratory Analysis Y1 - 2016 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Public Policy KW - Social Security AB - This paper examines the distributional implications of introducing additional means testing of Social Security benefits where proceeds are used to help balance Social Security's finances. Benefits of the top quarter of households ranked according to the relevant measure of means are reduced using a modified version of the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). The replacement rate in the first bracket of the benefit formula, determining the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), would be reduced from 90 percent to 40 percent of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). Four measures of means are considered: total wealth; an annualized measure of AIME; the wealth value of pensions; and a measure of average indexed lifetime W2 earnings. The empirical analysis is based on data from the Health and Retirement Study. These means tests would reduce total lifetime household benefits by 7 to 9 percentage points. We find that the basis for means testing Social Security makes a substantial difference as to which households have their benefits reduced, and that different means tests may have different effects on the benefits of families in similar circumstance. We also find that the measure of means used to evaluate the effects of a means test makes a considerable difference as to how one would view the effects of the means test on the distribution of benefits. JF - NBER Working Paper Series PB - Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research U4 - social Security/Public Policy/means testing/wealth/pension wealth ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Effects of social security policies on benefit claiming, retirement and saving JF - Journal of Public Economics Y1 - 2015 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Event History/Life Cycle KW - Health Conditions and Status KW - Methodology KW - Pensions KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - An enhanced version of a structural model jointly explains benefit claiming, wealth and retirement, including reversals from states of lesser to greater work. The model is estimated with Health and Retirement Study data. Alternative beliefs about the future of Social Security affect claiming behavior. Effects of three potential policies are also examined: increasing the early entitlement age, increasing the full retirement age, and eliminating the payroll tax for seniors. Predicted responses to increasing the full entitlement age are sensitive to beliefs. 2015 Elsevier B.V. PB - 129 VL - 129 UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84939170804andpartnerID=40andmd5=5f9a5d50350fd2d4594bc7142c636dc6 N1 - Export Date: 9 September 2015 U4 - Aging/Benefit claiming/Dynamic models/Intertemporal choice/Life cycle/Pensions/Retirement/Saving/Social Security ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Mismeasurement of pensions before and after retirement: the mystery of the disappearing pensions with implications for the importance of Social Security as a source of retirement support JF - Journal of Pension Economics and Finance Y1 - 2014 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Pensions KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - A review of the literature suggests that when pension values are measured by the wealth equivalent of promised defined benefit pension benefits and defined contribution balances for those approaching retirement, pensions account for more support in retirement than is suggested when their contribution is measured by incomes received directly from pension plans by those who have already retired. Estimates from the Health and Retirement Study for respondents in their early fifties suggest that pension wealth is about 82 as valuable as Social Security wealth. In data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), for members of the same cohort, measured when they are 65-69, pension incomes are about 58 as valuable as incomes from Social Security. Our empirical analysis uses data from the HRS to examine the reasons for these differences in the contributions of pensions as measured in income and wealth data. Key factors accounting for these differences include: a difference in methodology between surveys affecting what is included in pension income; some pension wealth 'disappears' at retirement because respondents change their pension into other forms that are not counted as pension income; and the form of annuitization may influence the measure of pension income. A series of caveats notwithstanding, the bottom line is that CPS data on pension incomes received in retirement understates the full contribution pensions make to supporting retirees. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT PB - 13 VL - 13 IS - 1 U4 - pensions/retirement planning/Public Policy/social security wealth/wealth/Defined benefit plans/Defined contribution pension plans/pension income ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study JF - Social Security Bulletin Y1 - 2014 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Income KW - Pensions KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This article uses Health and Retirement Study data to investigate the effects of Social Security's Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and Government Pension Offset (GPO) on Social Security benefits received by households. The provisions reduce benefits for individuals or the dependents of individuals whose work histories include jobs for which they were entitled to a pension and were not subject to Social Security payroll taxes ( noncovered employment). We find that about 3.5 percent of households are subject to either the WEP or the GPO, and that the provisions reduce the present value of their Social Security benefits by roughly one-fifth. Households affected by both provisions experience benefit reductions of about one-third. Under the WEP, the Social Security benefit reduction is capped at one-half of the amount of the pension from noncovered employment, which substantially reduces the WEP penalty and prevents the WEP adjustment from falling disproportionately on households in the lowest earnings category. PB - 74 VL - 74 IS - 3 N1 - Date revised - 2015-04-01 Availability - URL:http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/ Publisher's URL U4 - Retirement Policies/Wage Level and Structure/Wage Differentials/Public Sector Labor Markets/labor Force Participation/Earnings/Pensions/Public Employee/Social Security/Windfall Elimination Provision/Government Pension Offset ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Effects of Social Security Policies on Benefit Claiming, Retirement and Saving Y1 - 2013 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Healthcare KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - An enhanced version of a structural model jointly explains benefit claiming, wealth and retirement, including reversals from states of lesser to greater work. The model includes stochastic returns on assets. Estimated with Health and Retirement Study data, it does a better job of predicting claiming than previous versions. Alternative beliefs about the future of Social Security affect predicted outcomes. Effects of three potential policies are also examined: increasing the early entitlement age, increasing the full retirement age, and eliminating the payroll tax for seniors. Predicted responses to increasing the full entitlement age are sensitive to beliefs. PB - Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w19071 U4 - Retirement/Saving/Behavior/Social Security claiming rates/retirement planning/Public Policy ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Redistribution under the Social Security benefit formula at the individual and household levels, 1992 and 2004 JF - Journal of Pension Economics and Finance Y1 - 2013 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Adult children KW - Income KW - Pensions KW - Social Security KW - Women and Minorities AB - Studies using data from the early 1990s suggested that while the progressive Social Security benefit formula succeeded in redistributing benefits from individuals with high earnings to individuals with low earnings, it was much less successful in redistributing benefits from households with high earnings to households with low earnings. Wives often earned much less than their husbands. As a result, much of the redistribution at the individual level was effectively from high earning husbands to their own lower earning wives. In addition, spouse and survivor benefits accrue disproportionately to women from high income households. Both factors mitigate redistribution at the household level. It has been argued that with the increase in the labor force participation and earnings of women, Social Security now should do a better job of redistributing benefits at the household level. To be sure, when we compare outcomes for a cohort with a household member age 51 to 56 in 1992 with those from a cohort born twelve years later, redistribution at the household level has increased over time. Nevertheless, as of 2004 there still is substantially less redistribution of benefits from high to low earning households than from high to low earning individuals. PB - 12 VL - 12 IS - 1 N1 - Times Cited: 0 U4 - Social Security/Redistribution/Benefits/Spouse benefits/Survivor benefits/Benefit formula/Womens earnings/Family ER - TY - RPRT T1 - The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study Y1 - 2013 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to investigate the effects of Social Security s Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and Government Pension Offset (GPO) provision on Social Security benefits received by individuals and households. WEP reduces the benefits of individuals who worked in jobs covered by Social Security and also worked in uncovered jobs where a pension was earned. WEP also reduces spouse benefits. GPO reduces spouse and survivor benefits for persons who worked in uncovered government employment where they also earned a pension. Unlike previous studies, we take explicit account of pensions earned on jobs not covered by Social Security, a key determinant of the size of WEP and GPO adjustments. Also unlike previous studies, we focus on the household. This allows us to incorporate the full effects of WEP and GPO on spouse and survivor benefits, and to evaluate the effects of WEP and GPO on the assets accumulated by affected families. Among our specific findings: About 3.5 percent of households are subject to either WEP or to GPO. The present value of their Social Security benefits is reduced by roughly one fifth. This amounts to five to six percent of the total wealth they accumulate before retirement. Households affected by both WEP and GPO lose about one third of their benefit. Limiting the Social Security benefit to half the size of the pension from uncovered employment reduces the penalty from WEP for members of the original HRS cohort by about 60 percent. PB - Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan UR - http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp288.pdf U4 - public Pensions/retirement planning/social Security/Public Policy/government pension offset/windfall elimination provision ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Behavioral Effects of Social Security Policies on Benefit Claiming, Retirement and Saving Y1 - 2012 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper specifies three behavioral variants of a structural model of retirement and saving to bring predicted Social Security claiming rates closer to the rates observed in the data. The model, estimated with Health and Retirement Study data, is used to examine three potential policies: increasing early entitlement age, increasing normal retirement age, and eliminating payroll taxes after normal retirement age. Behavioral responses to increasing early entitlement age and eliminating the payroll tax are not affected by the behavioral variant used. Predicted effects of increasing the normal retirement age exhibit more sensitivity. Heterogeneity shapes the responses to these policy changes. JF - MRDRC Working Paper PB - Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, University of Michigan CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/behavioral-effects-of-social-security-policies-on-benefit-claiming-retirement-and-saving/ U4 - social security/Claiming behavior/Claiming behavior/early Retirement/retirement planning/Payroll tax/Public Policy ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Financial Knowledge and Financial Literacy at the Household Level JF - The American Economic Review Y1 - 2012 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Other KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - There is evidence of a relation between numeracy and wealth held outside of pensions and Social Security. With pensions and Social Security accounting for half of wealth at retirement, and evidence that those with pensions save more in other forms, one would expect to find knowledge of pensions and Social Security influencing retirement saving. Yet we find no evidence that knowledge of pensions and Social Security is related to nonpension, non-Social Security wealth, to numeracy, or that it plays an intermediate role in the numeracy-wealth relation. Our findings raise questions about policies that would enhance numeracy to increase retirement saving. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT PB - 102 VL - 102 IS - 3 U4 - numeracy/retirement planning/social security/Wealth/public policy ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The growth in Social Security benefits among the retirement-age population from increases in the cap on covered earnings. JF - Soc Secur Bull Y1 - 2012 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Aged KW - Cohort Studies KW - Female KW - Humans KW - Insurance Benefits KW - Male KW - Middle Aged KW - Models, Econometric KW - Public Policy KW - Salaries and Fringe Benefits KW - Social Security KW - Taxes KW - United States AB -

Analysts have proposed raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax (the "tax max") to improve long-term Social Security Trust Fund solvency. This article investigates how raising the tax max leads to the "leakage" of portions of the additional revenue into higher benefit payments. Using Health and Retirement Study data matched to Social Security earnings records, we compare historical payroll tax payments and benefit amounts for Early Boomers (born 1948-1953) with tax and benefit simulations had they been subject to the tax max (adjusted for wage growth) faced by cohorts 12 and 24 years older. We find that 43.2 percent of the additional payroll tax revenue attributable to tax max increases affecting Early Boomers relative to taxes paid by the cohort 12 years older leaked into higher benefits. For Early Boomers relative to those 24 years older, we find 53.5 percent leakage.

PB - 72 VL - 72 UR - https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n2/v72n2p49.html IS - 2 U1 - http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22799138?dopt=Abstract U4 - Social security/payroll tax/Public policy/retirement planning/taxation ER - TY - RPRT T1 - The Effects of Changes in Women s Labor Market Attachment on Redistribution Under the Social Security Benefit Formula Y1 - 2011 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Income KW - Pensions KW - Social Security KW - Women and Minorities AB - Studies using data from the early 1990s suggested that while the progressive Social Security benefit formula succeeded in redistributing benefits from individuals with high earnings to individuals with low earnings, it was much less successful in redistributing benefits from households with high earnings to households with low earnings. Wives often earned much less than their husbands. As a result, much of the redistribution at the individual level was effectively from high earning husbands to their own lower earning wives. In addition, spouse and survivor benefits accrue disproportionately to women from high income households. Both factors mitigate redistribution at the household level. This paper compares outcomes for the earlier cohort with those of a cohort born twelve years later. With greater growth in women's earnings, the aim of the study is to see whether, after the recent growth in two earner households, and the growth in women's labor market activity and earnings, the Social Security system now fosters somewhat more redistribution from high to low earning households. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study to study a population consisting of members of households with at least one person age 51 to 56 in either 1992 or in 2004. We use four different measures of redistribution: the ratio of the present value of benefits to taxes for households arrayed by decile of covered earnings; the fraction of total Social Security benefits redistributed from households with high earnings to those with low earnings; the share of total benefits paid to members of each cohort redistributed from households falling in the highest deciles of earners to those with lower covered earnings; and the rate of return to Social Security taxes for members with different amounts of covered earnings. Considering differences in earnings between cohorts, women enjoyed a more rapid growth of labor force participation, hours of work and covered earnings than men. This increased the redistribution of Social Security benefits among households. Nevertheless, a considerable gap remains between the labor market activities and earnings of women versus men. As a result, the Social Security system remains much less successful in redistributing benefits from households with high covered earnings to those with lower covered earnings than in redistributing benefits from individuals with high covered earnings to those with lower covered earnings. JF - Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center Working Paper PB - Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, University of Michigan CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/86250/wp248.pdf?sequence=1 U4 - social Security/benefit Formulas/Redistribution/labor Force Participation/women ER - TY - RPRT T1 - The Growth in Social Security Benefits Among the Retirement Age Population from Increases in the Cap on Covered Earnings Y1 - 2010 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - Tabatabai, Nahid KW - Demographics KW - Public Policy KW - Social Security AB - This paper investigates how increases in the level of maximum earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax have affected Social Security benefits and taxes. The analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to ask how different the present value of own benefits and taxes would be for the cohort born from 1948 to 1953 (ages 51 to 56 in 2004) if they faced the lower cap on the payroll tax that faced those born 12 and 24 years earlier, but otherwise had the same earnings stream and faced the same benefit formula. We find that for those in the Early Boomer cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, ages 51 to 56 in 2004, that after adjusting for nominal wage growth, benefits were increased by 1.5 percent by the increase in the payroll tax ceiling compared to the cohort 12 years older, and by 3.7 percent over the benefits under the payroll tax ceiling for the cohort 24 years older. Tax receipts were increased by 5.3 and 10.6 percent over tax receipts that would have been collected under the tax ceilings that applied to the cohorts 12 and 24 years older respectively. About 22 percent of the additional tax revenues created by the increase in the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer cohort and those 12 years older led to increased benefits. Similarly, about 27 percent of the additional tax revenues created by the increase in the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer cohort and those 24 years older led to increase benefits. Results are also presented separately for men and women, for those in the top quartile of earners, and for those at the tax ceiling throughout their work lives. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA U4 - social Security/early boomers/earnings and Benefits File/Public Policy/payroll tax/tax revenues ER - TY - JOUR T1 - How Changes in Social Security Affect Retirement Trends JF - Research on Aging Y1 - 2009 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - For married men, we find the conventional view of retirement trends that the long term trend to early retirement has been reversed -- is partially contradicted by recent data. Specifically, descriptive data collected from both the Census and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) suggest that for those in their fifties, over the periods 1992 to 1998 and 1998 to 2004, the trend to early retirement reasserted itself and labor force participation fell. In contrast, for those in their sixties, there was an increase in work. Similarly, for those 65 and over, the amount of work increased. Simulations with a structural retirement model suggest that the recent acceleration of the trend to early retirement for those in their fifties is not the result of the change in Social Security rules. According to our model, changes in Social Security rules are expected to reduce the number of those in their early sixties who are working. This suggests that forces other than changing Social Security rules account for the observed increase in work by those in their early sixties, and that the effects of these forces are stronger than those suggested by the trends in descriptive data. Lastly, the analysis suggests that changing Social Security rules do help to explain the increase in work by those age 65 and older. The effects of these rule changes encourage workers to remain in their long term jobs for a longer time, encourage some to return from retirement to full time work, and encourage more partial retirement. Nevertheless, the changes in retirement induced by Social Security changes have been modest. Due to Social Security changes, the number of 65 year old married men at work increases by about two percentage points at ages 65 and 66, with slightly smaller changes at 67 to 69. Given the low basic labor force participation at 65 and 66, with 20 to 25 percent at full time work, and another 17 percent at part time work, the percentage increases in work due to Social Security changes are three or four times higher. PB - 31 VL - 31 IS - 2 U4 - Retirement Behavior/Labor Force Participation/Social Security ER - TY - RPRT T1 - What the Stock Market Decline Means for the Financial Security and Retirement Choices of the Near-Retirement Population Y1 - 2009 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier A1 - N. Tabatabai KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Social Security AB - This paper investigates the effect of the current recession on the near-retirement age population. Data from the Health and Retirement Study suggest that those approaching retirement age (early boomers ages 53 to 58 in 2006) have only 15.2 percent of their wealth in stocks, held directly or in defined contribution plans or IRAs. Their vulnerability to a stock market decline is limited by the high value of their Social Security wealth, which represents over a quarter of the total household wealth of the early boomers. In addition, their defined contribution plans remain immature, so their defined benefit plans represent sixty five percent of their pension wealth. Simulations with a structural retirement model suggest the stock market decline will lead the early boomers to postpone their retirement by only 1.5 months on average. Health and Retirement Study data also show that those approaching retirement are not likely to be greatly or immediately affected by the decline in housing prices. We end with a discussion of important difficulties facing those who would use labor market policies to increase the employment of older workers. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA U4 - Wealth/Stock Market/Retirement Saving/Retirement Wealth/Social Security expectations ER - TY - RPRT T1 - How Does Modeling of Retirement Decisions at the Family Level Affect Estimates of the Impact of Social Security Policies on Retirement? Y1 - 2008 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - modeling KW - Policy KW - Retirement KW - Social Security AB - This paper applies structural models of retirement and saving of two earner couples to explore the effects on retirement of two actuarially neutral policies, which we know from previous work can have a substantial effect on retirement if heterogeneity in time preference rates is allowed. The main question being investigated here is whether using a model that explicitly incorporates the retirement interactions of two working spouses yields a different evaluation of policies than when a much simpler model that treats the retirement decisions of the second spouse as exogenous is used. The findings indicate that unless the question of interest is specifically related to joint retirement issues, the effects of the two actuarially neutral policies being investigated are roughly equal whichever model is estimated. A second question explored in the paper is whether two earner and one earner households can be combined in the analysis. The effects of policy changes are clearly different for one earner and two earner households, but there is some evidence that the principal difference is due to the differing budget sets of the two groups. Though the estimated preference parameters are significantly different, the critical parameters governing responses to policy changes are similar. As a result, it seems plausible that unless the question being investigated involves looking at these two groups separately, the overall impact of the policy changes may be adequately assessed by combining the two groups, separately identifying them by a dummy variable. A third question involves the magnitude of the effects for these two specific policy changes. Increasing the Social Security early entitlement age from 62 to 64 would reduce the level of retirement for husbands from two earner households by 4.4-4.6 percentage points at age 62, and by 5.1-5.7 percentage points for wives. In contrast, this policy change would induce husbands from one earner households to reduce the level of retirement by 10.2 percentage points at age 62. In a system of personal accounts, offering Social Security benefits as a lump sum instead of as an annuity would increase the level of retirement for husbands from two earner households by 7.1-8.1 percentage points at age 62 and by 8.9 percentage points for husbands in one earner households, and by 2.8-3.2 percentage points for wives in two earner households. PB - Michigan Retirement Research Center CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287302 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Imperfect Knowledge of Social Security and Pensions JF - Industrial Relations Y1 - 2005 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Education KW - Pensions KW - Social Security AB - Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, this paper creates variables measuring knowledge about future social security and pension benefits by comparing respondent reports of their expected benefits with benefits calculated from social security earnings records and employer provided descriptions of pension plans. The knowledge measures suggest that misinformation, imprecision and lack of information about retirement benefits is the norm. Those who are most dependent on social security are the least well informed about their social security benefits, while those who are most dependent on pensions are best informed about their pension benefits. Women and minorities are less well informed about both types of retirement benefits. Having documented the extent of misinformation, we turn to questions about the production of information, and the consequences of misinformation for real outcomes. Relating measures of information to planning activities, we find that those who plan are somewhat better informed than those who do not, but with the exception of having requested a social security earnings record, the effects of planning activities on knowledge are modest. In descriptive and reduced form equations for planned and actual retirement and saving, there is at best a modest relation of knowledge measures to planned and actual retirement and to nonpension, nonsocial security wealth as a share of lifetime earnings. Individuals who overestimate their benefits are likely to retire sooner than they planned, but the measured effects are relatively modest. Coefficients of measures of the increase in reward from postponed retirement are barely affected by the addition of measures of respondent knowledge of their retirement benefits to standard reduced form retirement and wealth equations. PB - 44 VL - 44 IS - 2 U4 - Pensions/Social Security/Knowledge ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Retirement Effects of Proposals by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security JF - National Tax Journal Y1 - 2005 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Retirement KW - Social Security AB - The effects on retirement of proposals by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security are simulated using an econometric model of retirement and saving. In the absence of any policy reforms, and holding other market adjustments constant, increases in real wages are predicted to increase retirement from full time work at age 62 by 8.7 percentage points over the next 70 years. However, two leading proposals put forth by the Commission, model 2 and model 3, will offset almost half this trend, reducing retirement from full–time work at age 62 by roughly five and three percentage points, respectively. VL - 58 UR - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=701296 IS - 1 ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Retirement, Saving, Benefit Claiming and Solvency Under a Partial System of Voluntary Personal Accounts Y1 - 2005 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Social Security AB - This paper is based on a structural model of retirement and saving, estimated with data for a sample of married men in the Health and Retirement Study. The model simulates how various features of a system of personal Social Security accounts jointly affects retirement, saving, the choice of whether benefits are taken as an annuity or lump sum, taxes paid and the course of benefits with age. Among our findings: Under a system of partial personal accounts, the fraction of 62 year olds at full time work would decline by about 22 percent compared to retirements under the current benefit formula. If the current system were replaced completely by personal accounts, the fraction at full time work would decline by about a third. If all benefits from personal accounts could be taken as a lump sum, the fraction not retired at age 62 would fall by about 5 percentage points compared to a system where there is mandatory annuitization of benefits. Unless annuitization is mandatory, there would be substantial diversion of benefits to age 62, reducing benefits received in one s 70s and 80s by 20 percent or more. JF - Michigan Retirement Research Center Publication PB - Michigan Retirement Research Center, University of Michigan CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/retirement-saving-benefit-claiming-and-solvency-under-a-partial-system-of-voluntary-personal-accounts-2/ U4 - Retirement Saving/Social Security/Annuities ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Social Security and Retirement Dynamics Y1 - 2005 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Social Security AB - This paper is based on a structural model of retirement and saving, estimated with data for a sample of married men in the Health and Retirement Study. It explains the relation of specific features of Social Security -- the benefit amount, the early entitlement age, the normal retirement age, earnings test parameters, and the delayed retirement credit -- to the full range of retirement outcomes -- continued work on the main job, full time work outside the main job after a period of partial or full retirement, as well as partial retirement and full retirement. The project also estimates the relation of Social Security to the flows among these states. We consider not only the effect of Social Security on movement from states of greater to lesser work, the probability of either moving from full time work to partial retirement or directly to full retirement, or from partial retirement to full retirement, but the reverse flows from states of lesser work to states of greater work. The largest effects of the policies examined are from increasing the early entitlement age from 62 to 64 and reducing benefits to 75 percent of their promised levels, the approximate amount benefits would have to be reduced when the trust fund runs out if there are no changes in funding. With the older early entitlement age, about 5 percent more of the population continues to work full time at their main job at 62 and 63 than would otherwise. In addition, another 4.5 percent of the male population works full time after having retired, as does another 4 percent at age 63. Partial retirement is reduced at ages 62 and 63 by about 3 percentage points when the early entitlement age is 64. Overall, complete retirements are about 6 percentage points lower at 62 and 63 when the early retirement age is higher. From age 64 on, the percent completely retired is about two percentage points lower in each year when the early entitlement age is 64 rather than 62. The effects of reducing promised Social Security benefits by about a quarter are also large. The probability of remaining on the main job is higher for those in their sixties, with the difference ranging from 3 to 5 percentage points for those ages 62 and older. At each year of age, an additional 1 percentage point will be in full time work after having retired. There is little difference in the fraction partially retired, so the probability of being fully retired is reduced by 4 to 6 percentage points when benefits are reduced by a quarter. JF - Michigan Retirement Research Center Research Project PB - The University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/projects/social-security-and-retirement-dynamics/ U4 - Retirement Saving/Social Security ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Minimum Hours Constraints, Job Requirements and Retirement Y1 - 2004 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Disabilities KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Pensions KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - A structural retirement model estimated with data from the Health and Retirement Study is used to simulate the effects of policies firms might adopt to improve employment conditions for older workers and thereby encourage delayed retirement. Firm policies that effectively abolished minimum hours constraints would strongly increase the number partially retired, while reducing full time work and full retirement, resulting in only a small net increase in full time equivalent employment. Reducing physical and mental requirements of jobs would have much weaker effects on retirement than was suggested by work with the 1970s Retirement History Study. Reducing informal pressures to retire, increasing employer accommodations to health problems, and reducing the prevalence of layoffs and retirement windows would have only small effects on retirement outcomes. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - The National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA N1 - ProCite field 3 : Unlisted; Unlisted U4 - Retirement/Public Policy/Economics of the Elderly/Handicapped/Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits/Private Pensions/Social Security and Public Pensions ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Personal Accounts and Family Retirement Y1 - 2004 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper constructs a model of retirement and saving by two earner couples. The model includes three dimensions of behavior: the joint determination of retirement and saving; heterogeneity in time preference; and the interdependence of retirement decisions of husbands and wives. Estimation is based on panel data from the Health and Retirement Study covering the period 1992 to 2000. When husbands postpone their retirement so they can retire together with their typically younger wives, the spike in retirement at age 62 is smeared to later ages. Thus retirements differ between one and two earner families. We find both an asymmetry in which husbands prefer their wife to be retired before they retire, and a clear distaste of many husbands to retiring when their wives are in poor health, while the wives are willing to stay at home with sickly husbands. We simulate a system of personal Social Security accounts based on a 10.6 percent contribution rate over the lifetime. One version allows individuals to make lump sum withdrawals at retirement instead of annuitizing. This program would increase the retirement rates of husbands at age 62 by about 15 percentage points compared to the current system. Adding a lump sum option, by itself, would increase retirements at 62 by about 6 percentage points. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - The National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA U4 - Retirement/Public Policy/Social Security and Public Pensions ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Social Security, Pensions and Retirement Behaviour Within the Family JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics Y1 - 2004 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Adult children KW - Pensions KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper estimates a structural model of family retirement using US data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). It provides further insight into household retirement decision making and the reasons for interdependence in the retirement decisions of each spouse. Improvements in HRS data and matched employer provided pension histories allow more precise identification of key parameters governing interdependent behaviour within the household. In an earlier study we found that interdependence was due to preferences rather than coordination of retirement incentives in the budget, and in particular that it is not a correlation in preferences, but the appearance of the spouse's retirement status in the husband's and wife's utility function that is largely responsible for coordination of retirement between spouses. We now find that a measure of how much each spouse values being able to spend time in retirement with the other accounts for a good portion of that apparent interdependence. For the wife, the husband's retirement status influences her retirement decision only if she values spending time in retirement with her husband. For husbands, the effect of having the wife already retired on his retirement decision is roughly doubled if he enjoys spending time in retirement with his wife, but there is some effect even if he does not. This is consistent with our earlier findings that the husband is more influenced by having a retired spouse than the wife is. The increase in the extent of the dependence of the wife's labour supply on the husband's retirement from our past work probably is traceable to better measurement of the opportunity set facing the husband in HRS data. Once estimated, we use the model to investigate the labour supply effects of alternative social security policies, examining the effect of dividing credit for earnings evenly between spouses, or of basing social security benefits on the amounts accumulated in private accounts. Both policies change the relative importance of spouse and survivor social security benefits within the household and both raise the relative reward to work later in the life cycle. The incentives created are modest, and retirement responds accordingly. Nevertheless, at some ages, such as 65, there may be as much as a 6 increase in the old age work force under privatized accounts. Copyright 2004 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. PB - 19 VL - 19 IS - 6 N1 - RDA 1996-005; HRS 1992 U4 - Retirement Behavior/Social Security/Pensions/Family ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Understanding Patterns of Social Security Benefit Receipt, Pensions Incomes, Retirement and Saving by Race, Ethnicity, Gender and Marital Status: A Structural Approach Y1 - 2004 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - ethnicity KW - gender KW - pension incomes KW - race KW - Retirement KW - Social Security KW - Social Security Benefits AB - In this paper we use data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine differences in retirement behavior, wealth, Social Security and pension benefits by race and gender. The differences observed among groups are sometimes substantial. We then estimate models jointly explaining retirement and wealth by race and gender. We decompose differences in outcomes into those due to differences in parameters of the preference function for leisure and goods, time preference rates, and those due to differences in the circumstances of the members of each group. By circumstances we mean both the opportunity set, and factors that determine the disutility of continued work, such as health status. We find that differences in outcomes among white, black and Hispanic males are not due to differences in preferences for leisure and goods consumption, but are due both to differences in time preference and to differences in circumstances. Differences in outcomes between men and women are primarily due to differences in preferences. Authors’ Acknowledgement This paper was supported by a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) to the Michigan Retirement Research Center, UM 03-13. The opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of SSA, the Michigan Retirement Research Center, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Alan L. Gustman is Loren Berry Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, Department of Economics, Hanover, N.H. 03755 (alan.l.gustman@dartmouth.edu). Thomas L. Steinmeier is Professor of Economics, Texas Tech University, Department of Economics, Lubbock, Texas 79409 (Thomas.Steinmeier@TTU.edu). JF - Michigan Retirement Research Center Research Project PB - Michigan Retirement Research Center CY - Ann Arbor, MI UR - https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/projects/understanding-patterns-of-social-security-benefit-receipt-pensions-incomes-retirement-and-saving-by-race-ethnicity-gender-and-marital-status-a-structured-approach/ ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Retirement Effects of Proposals by the President's Commision to Strengthen Social Security Y1 - 2003 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Retirement KW - Social Security AB - A structural dynamic model of retirement and saving is used to simulate the retirement effects of proposals made by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security. Provisions reducing the growth in real benefits and increasing actuarial incentives to work reduce retirements. They more than offset increases in retirements caused by individual accounts, increased benefits for low wage workers and survivors, and reductions in the top AIME bracket. By 2075, the Commission's proposals would reduce retirements at age 62 by roughly 4 percentage points, mitigating an 8.7 percentage point trend to earlier retirement projected to reassert itself after its recent interruption. JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series PB - The National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA VL - No. 10030 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10030 N1 - Author contact info:Alan L. GustmanDepartment of EconomicsDartmouth CollegeHanover, NH 03755-3514Tel: 603/646-2641Fax: 603/646-2122E-Mail: ALAN.L.GUSTMAN@DARTMOUTH.EDUThomas L. SteinmeierDepartment of EconomicsTexas Tech UniversityLubbock, TX 79409E-Mail: thomas.steinmeier@ttu.edu ER - TY - CHAP T1 - What People Don't Know About Their Pensions and Social Security: An Analysis Using Linked Data from the Health and Retirement Study T2 - Public Policies and Private Pensions Y1 - 2003 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier ED - William G. Gale ED - John B. Shoven ED - Mark J. Warshawsky KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Income KW - Pensions KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Pension plan descriptions from respondents to the 1992 Health and Retirement Study are compared with descriptions obtained from their employers. Earnings histories reported by respondents are compared with earnings histories from the Social Security Administration. The probability of linking employer pension data, which is two thirds for current jobs, and of obtaining permission to link an earnings history, which is over 70 percent, are not well explained by respondent characteristics. Half of respondents with linked pension data correctly identify plan type, and fewer than half identify, within one year, dates of eligibility for early and normal retirement benefits. Benefit reduction rates are essentially not reported. Respondents do better in reporting pension values, but the unexplained variation is still considerable. In contrast, respondent reported values together with other observables, account for 80 percent of the variation in pension values and 75 percent of the variation in covered earnings measured from linked records. Thus prospects are good for imputing plan values, but not for imputing the location or size of early retirement incentives. Our findings raise questions about how well respondents understand complex pension and Social Security rules. JF - Public Policies and Private Pensions PB - Brookings Institution CY - Washington, DC UR - https://www.nber.org/papers/w7368 N1 - RDA 1996-005ProCite field[8]: eds. U4 - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution/Social Security and Public Pensions/Economics of the Elderly/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits/Private Pensions/Pension/Social Security/Retirement/Income Distribution/Nonwage Benefits ER - TY - JOUR T1 - How Effective is Redistribution Under the Social Security Benefit Formula? JF - Journal of Public Economics Y1 - 2001 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Income KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - In this study, data from the Health and Retirement Study linked to the Social Security Administration is used in order to analyze wealth redistribution by way of Social Security. This redistribution seems to go from the upper earners to the lower earners. More specifically, the wealth is being redistributed from men to women and, when looking at the household context, from primary earners to secondary earners. The study also illustrates wealth redistribution when specific factors are taken into account and show how much of an effect different variables have on the redistribution of wealth. From their analysis the authors conclude that privatizing the Social Security system would have no effect on redistribution of wealth. PB - 82 VL - 82 IS - 1 N1 - RDA 1996-005 U4 - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution/Social Security and Public Pensions/Economics of the Elderly/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Social Security/Income Redistribution/Retirement ER - TY - RPRT T1 - How Effective is Redistribution Under the Social Security Benefit Formula? Y1 - 2000 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Income KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper uses earnings histories obtained from the Social Security Administration and linked to the survey responses for participants in the Health and Retirement Study to investigate redistribution under the current social security benefit formula. When individuals are arrayed by indexed lifetime earnings, benefits are significantly redistributed from those with high lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings. However, much of this apparent redistribution is from men to women, and when examined at the level of the family, from primary to secondary earners. When families are arrayed according the total lifetime earnings, and spouse and survivor benefits are taken into account, the extent of redistribution from families with high lifetime earnings to families with low lifetime earnings is roughly halved. When families are arrayed by their earnings potential, i.e., earnings during years when both spouses are engaged in substantial work, there is very little redistribution from families with high to low earnings capacity. Accordingly, at least for families on the verge of retirement day, introducing a system that ignored issues of redistribution would have no major effect on the distribution of social security benefits net of taxes among families with different earnings capacities. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - National Bureau of Economic Research CY - Cambridge, MA UR - https://www.nber.org/papers/w7597#:~:text=When%20families%20are%20arrayed%20according,lifetime%20earnings%20is%20roughly%20halved. U4 - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution/Social Security and Public Pensions/Economics of the Elderly/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Social Security/Income Redistribution/Retirement ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Retirement Outcomes in the Health and Retirement Study JF - Social Security Bulletin Y1 - 2000 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Demographics KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This study examines retirement outcomes in the first four waves of the 1992 -98 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The article compares outcomes under alternative definitions of retirement, describes differences in outcomes among demographic groups, compares retirement dynamics based on self-reported retirement status, and compares retirement flows in the 1990s and 1970s and between cohorts of the HRS. Among other findings, measured retirement is seen to differ, sometimes substantially, with the definition of retirement used and among the various groups analyzed. PB - 63 VL - 63 UR - https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v63n4/v63n4p57.pdf IS - 4 N1 - ProCite field 3 : Dartmouth College; TX Tech U U4 - Retirement/Retirement Policies/Economics of the Elderly/Social Security and Public Pensions/Demographics/Retirement ER - TY - CHAP T1 - Social Security Benefits of Immigrants and U.S. Born T2 - Issues in the Economics of Immigration Y1 - 2000 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier ED - Borjas, George KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Demographics KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Pensions KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Immigrants realize higher Social Security benefits per year worked in the U.S. then U.S. born, even when earnings are identical in all years the immigrant has been in the U.S. The benefit formula favors those with low lifetime covered earnings, and the years prior to immigration are treated as years of zero earnings. If instead earnings were averaged only over years of residence in the U.S., and benefits were prorated based on the share of a 35 or 40 year base period spent in residence, immigrants would receive the same return on their social security taxes as U.S. born. For a sample from the Health and Retirement Study, a group born between 1931 and 1941, prorating reduces immigrants' social security benefits by 7 to 15 percent. For immigrants who entered in the 1980's, the reductions would be over 30 percent. Prorating would reduce the present value of benefit payments to immigrants born from 1932 to 1941 by 7.5 billion to 15 billion. Most immigrants will still pay slightly more in taxes than they will receive in benefits. Taxes received from immigrants who subsequently emigrate without collecting benefits tip the balance in favor of including immigrants. JF - Issues in the Economics of Immigration PB - University of Chicago Press N1 - RDA 1996-005 ProCite field 8 : ed. U4 - Migration--International/Social Security and Public Pensions/Economics of the Elderly/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Immigrants/Social Security/Benefit Formulas/Taxes ER - TY - CHAP T1 - Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study T2 - Wealth, Work and Health: Innovations in Measurement in the Social Sciences Y1 - 1999 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Olivia S. Mitchell A1 - Andrew A. Samwick A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier ED - James P Smith ED - Robert J. Willis KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Pensions KW - Social Security AB - This study attempts to understand the impact of pension and social security wealth on decisions made by people of retirement age. Their in-depth analysis of the Health and Retirement Study gives many interesting findings. Of those people participating in the Health and Retirement Study, more then half of the wealth is in the form of social security, pensions, and health insurance. Various topics are explored in this paper. JF - Wealth, Work and Health: Innovations in Measurement in the Social Sciences PB - University of Michigan Press CY - Ann Arbor, MI N1 - RDA 1996-005; Revision of Pension Research Council Working Paper PRC WP 97-3 ProCite field 8 : eds. U4 - Pensions/Social Security/Wealth JO - Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Effects of Pensions on Savings: Analysis with Data from the Health and Retirement Study Y1 - 1998 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Adult children KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Income KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Pensions KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - This paper examines the composition and distribution of total wealth for a cohort of 51- to 61-year olds from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and the role of pensions in forming retirement wealth. Pension coverage is widespread, covering two-thirds of households and accounting for one-quarter of accumulated wealth. Social security benefits account for another quarter of total wealth. As calculated from earnings records, the present discounted value of social security benefits is less than the present value of taxes paid. Earlier than many expected, social security is already a poor investment on average for this cohort on the verge of retirement. When pensions and social security are included, wealth accumulated by the HRS population to date is substantial. At their expected retirement date, using only the wealth accumulated by their mid-fifties, the HRS household with median replacement rate could finance a fixed, nominal two-thirds joint and survivor annuity replacing 79 percent of last earnings, and a real annuity replacing 52 percent of last earnings. Replacement rates for median earners are higher. Additional savings made over the seven years remaining until retirement will raise those replacement rates by about a fifth. When measured against a standard of adequacy based on average yearly earnings over the worklife, with adjustments made for the absence of preretirement savings, children, taxes, work-related expenses and other factors, these replacement rates appear adequate. Lifetime earnings are measured for each individual in the HRS from social security earnings records augmented by self-reported earnings histories. When pensions and social security are counted in total wealth, the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings declines from very high levels in the bottom ten percent of the earnings distribution, remains at roughly 40 percent from the 25th through 95th percentile of the lifetime earnings distribution, and then falls to 32 percent for those in the top five percent of the earnings distribution. This result is consistent with the predictions of a simple, stripped-down life-cycle model. Also consistent is a finding that the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings is no higher for those with pensions than for those without pensions. However, heterogeneity is quite important. Real estate and business wealth are a larger share of total wealth for those without pensions, reflecting the importance of self-employment in wealth accumulation. Multivariate regressions relating total wealth to pension coverage and pension value, which standardize for sources of heterogeneity, suggest that pensions cause very limited displacement of other wealth, if any. Pensions add to total wealth by at least half the value of the pension, and in most estimates by a good deal more. These findings are not consistent with a simple life-cycle explanation for savings. They also raise questions about whether pensions are fundamentally a tax avoidance device, allowing substitution of pension for nonpension savings. JF - NBER Working Paper PB - NBER CY - Cambridge UR - https://www.nber.org/papers/w6681.pdf N1 - RDA 1996-005 ProCite field 8 : Dartmouth College and NBER; TX Tech U U4 - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Social Security and Public Pensions/Nonwage Labor/Private Pensions/Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis/Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis/Distribution/Households/Pension/Retirement/Saving/Social Security/Wealth ER - TY - CHAP T1 - Privatizing Social Security: First Round Effects of a Generic Voluntary Privatized U.S. Social Security System T2 - Privatizing Social Security Y1 - 1998 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Olivia S. Mitchell A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier ED - Feldstein, M.S. KW - Methodology KW - Public Policy KW - Social Security JF - Privatizing Social Security PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago, IL N1 - ProCite field 8 : ed. U4 - Social Security Research/Privatization/Public Policy JO - Privatizing Social Security: First Round Effects of a Generic Voluntary Privatized U.S. Social Security System ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study Y1 - 1997 A1 - Alan L Gustman A1 - Olivia S. Mitchell A1 - Andrew A. Samwick A1 - Thomas L. Steinmeier KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Income KW - Medicare/Medicaid/Health Insurance KW - Methodology KW - Net Worth and Assets KW - Pensions KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Together, pensions, social security and health insurance account for half of the wealth held by all households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), for 60 percent of total wealth of HRS households who are in the 45th to 55th wealth percentiles, and even for 48 percent of wealth for those in the 90th to 95th wealth percentiles. The HRS surveys households aged 51 to 61 in 1992, and obtains pension plan descriptions from respondents' employers. Pension accrual profiles, income and wealth distributions by type, wealth-income ratios and accrued wealth by pension status are also explored. PB - National Bureau of Economic Research UR - https://www.nber.org/papers/w5912 N1 - ProCite field 8 : Dartmouth College and NBER U4 - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution/Macroeconomics:/Saving/Social Security and Public Pensions/Economics of the Elderly/Retirement/Retirement Policies/Private Pensions/Health Insurance/Pension/Retirement/Social Security/Wealth ER -