TY - CHAP T1 - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States T2 - Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World Y1 - 2010 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan ED - Gruber, Jonathan ED - David A Wise KW - Other KW - Public Policy KW - Social Security JF - Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World T3 - A National Bureau of Economic Research conference report PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago U4 - social security/OASDI/earnings and Benefits File/actuarial reform/common reform/social security wealth JO - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Future Social Security Entitlements and the Retirement Decision JF - Review of Economics and Statistics Y1 - 2007 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Employment and Labor Force KW - Methodology KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect retirement behavior. We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male retirement. We implement forward-looking models whereby individuals consider the incentives to work in all future years. We find that forwardlooking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of retirement. We also find that private pension incentives have roughly similar effects. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies that increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the labor force exit rate of older workers. PB - 89 VL - 89 IS - 2 U4 - Retirement planning/Labor Supply/Social Security Research/Social Security benefit claiming/Entitlements ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in the United States Y1 - 2003 A1 - Courtney Coile A1 - Gruber, Jonathan KW - Public Policy KW - Retirement Planning and Satisfaction KW - Social Security AB - Social Security is the largest social insurance program in the U.S., and has been shown to be a major determinant of the labor supply decisions of older workers. As such, reforming the Social Security system can have two fiscal impacts: a mechanical effect through changing the rules on benefits entitlements or taxation, and a behavioral effect through individual responses to these changes in benefits or taxes. We build a simulation model that computes these effects for major reforms to the system, building on estimated retirement responses to changing net Social Security entitlements. We then estimate the fiscal impact of reform for the 1931-1941 cohort of workers represented by the Health and Retirement Survey. We find that raising the early and normal retirement age by three years would reduce net costs for this cohort by roughly 30 , and that moving to a much higher benefit level would raise net costs by roughly 55 . Importantly, we find that in both cases the behavioral impacts on net costs are relatively small, at most one-third, and generally less than one-fifth of the total. The reason for these small effects is that the U.S. Social Security system is roughly actuarially fair, so that delaying or inducing retirement has relatively little impact on system balances; most of the effects that do arise are due to changes in general income and consumption taxes. JF - Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Working Papers PB - Center for Retirement Research at Boston College CY - Boston UR - https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/fiscal-effects-of-social-security-reform-in-the-united-states/ N1 - RDA U4 - Retirement Behavior/Public Policy/Social Security ER -