%0 Report %D 2023 %T Using Administrative Data to Validate HRS Survey Responses on Application for DI and SSI Disability Benefits %A John Bound %A Charles Brown %A Fang, Chichun %K administrative data %K disability insurance %K Social Security %K Supplemental Security Income %X In this paper, we use administrative data from the Social Security Administration to validate survey responses for the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) regarding the application for disability benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), focusing on applications that occurred after individuals entered the HRS. In our samples, amongst those that the administrative data identifies as having applied for DI or SSI, over 40% either do not report having applied or inaccurately identify whether or not the application was successful. We find some evidence that the less well educated, those with cognitive limitations, and those experiencing a health limitation on their capacity for work are more likely to misreport applications. We also explore the effect that reporting errors have on parameter estimates in a simple model of the application for DI benefits. Parameter estimates are qualitatively similar regardless of whether we use survey or administrative data to identify the application for DI benefits in our model. %I Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, University of Michigan %C Ann Arbor, MI %G eng %U https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/using-administrative-data-to-validate-hrs-survey-responses-on-application-for-di-and-ssi-disability-benefits/ %0 Journal Article %J SSRN %D 2021 %T Guaranteed Income: A License to Spend %A David Blanchett %A Michael S. Finke %K annuities %K Personal finance %K Retirement income %K Social Security %X Prior research finds that retirees don’t spend nearly as much as they could from their investments. Economic theory provides both rational and behavioral explanations for under-spending among retirees with high non-annuitized wealth. Longevity risk will result in lower spending among rational, risk-averse retirees. Retirees may also exhibit behavioral preferences that make them far more comfortable spending from income than assets. We explore how the composition of retirement assets is related to retirement spending and find that retirees who hold a higher percentage of their wealth in guaranteed income spend more than retirees whose wealth consists primarily of non-annuitized assets. Marginal estimates suggest that investment assets generate about half of the amount of additional spending as an equal amount of wealth held in guaranteed income. In other words, retirees will spend twice as much each year in retirement if they shift investment assets into guaranteed income wealth. The size of the effect suggests that the explanation for under-spending non-annuitized savings is likely both a behavioral and a rational response to longevity risk. %B SSRN %G eng %U https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3875802 %0 Report %D 2020 %T Does Working Longer Enhance Old Age? %A Maria D Fitzpatrick %K health %K Retirement %K Social Security %K Working Longer %X Understanding the link between retirement and health is crucial for both improving people's wellbeing and for designing optimal public policy around retirement. Yet, to date, the economics literature has been inconclusive about whether retirement causes improvements or deterioration in health. The lack of consensus is likely driven by differences in study design, population, and the age of workers and set of health outcomes studied. In this paper, I explain and distill the literature, highlight patterns in the highestquality studies, and discuss the implications of the findings for longevity risk management and worker and retiree health going forward. %B Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers %I The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania %C Philadelphia, PA %G eng %U https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1691&context=prc_papers %0 Report %D 2019 %T The retirement solution hiding in plain sight %A Fellows, Matt %A Fichtner, Jason %A Plews, Lincoln %A Whitman, Kevin %K Decision making %K Retirement %K Social Security %X Social Security now accounts for about one-third of all income annually received by U.S. retirees, amounting to $1 trillion in annual benefits. While impactful, research consistently finds that the financial effect of Social Security could be even greater if more people waited to enroll, since monthly benefits can increase in value if retirees delay claiming. But, we don’t know how much is annually lost from households making the sub-optimal decision about when to claim Social Security, how many are making mistakes, or who is making those wrong decisions. To explore these questions, we utilize new technology invented by United Income and data sponsored by the Social Security Administration, finding: Retirees will collectively lose $3.4 trillion in potential income that they could spend during their retirement because they claimed Social Security at a financially sub-optimal time, or an average of $111,000 per household. The average Social Security recipient would receive 9 percent more income in retirement if they made the financially optimal decision about when to claim this retirement benefit. Current retirees will collectively lose an estimated $2.1 trillion in wealth because they made the sub-optimal decision about when to claim Social Security, or an average of $68,000 per household. Most retirees will lose wealth in their 60s and early 70s if they choose to optimize Social Security, but will be wealthier in their late 70s through the rest of their lives. Only 4 percent of retirees make the financially optimal decision about when to claim Social Security. About 57 percent of retirees would build more wealth through their life if they waited to claim until they were 70 years old (when only 4 percent of retirees currently claim), while only 6.5 percent of retirees would have more wealth if they claimed prior to turning 64 (when over 70 percent of retirees currently claim benefits). About 21 percent of those at risk of not affording retirement (or having enough income to cover their expected cost of living) would see an improvement in their chances if they claimed Social Security at the optimal time. Among those retirees at risk that start with a greater than 10 percent chance of affording retirement, 95 percent see their chances of affording retirement improve by an average of 28 percent. Elderly poverty could be cut by nearly 50 percent if all retirees claimed Social Security at the financially optimal time. In particular, about 13 percent of people over the age of 70 are expected to live in poverty at some point, which is estimated to fall to 7 percent if retirees had claimed Social Security at the optimal time –a rate that could potentially fall even further if they earned additional income while they waited to claim Social Security. This report finds that nearly no retirees are making the financially optimal decision about Social Security, and that the costs of those mistakes are high for retiring households, particularly those at risk of not being able to afford retirement. In addition, since making the optimal decision means sacrificing wealth in the near-term, we think it is unlikely more people will make the right decision without a policy intervention. There are numerous difficulties associated with solving this problem, though, which will require a thorough and diverse process for addressing. Among the topics for consideration should be the eligibility age range rules, which were last materially modified in 1983. Since 92 percent of retirees are expected to be better off waiting to claim until at least their 65th birthday, claiming before should ideally be an exception for those who demonstrably need to claim benefits before the full retirement age. Means-testing rules may be one way to address this, though an easier place to start would be to change how the Social Security Administration frames claiming age options to the public. Instead of portraying age 62 as the “early eligibility age,” for instance, claiming at age 62 could instead be labeled as the “minimum benefit age” while age 70 could be labeled as the “maximum benefit age.” The Social Security Administration could also be provided with resources to improve utilization of the policy it administers, perhaps in partnership with third-party fiduciaries. With the potential to put $2.1 trillion wealth and $3.4 trillion in income in the pockets of retirees, policymakers should be focused on improving this program. %B United Income White Papers %I Capital One %C Washington, D.C. %G eng %U https://unitedincome.capitalone.com/library/the-retirement-solution-hiding-in-plain-sight %0 Journal Article %J Health Economics %D 2018 %T Mental health and retirement savings: Confounding issues with compounding interest %A Bogan, Vicki L. %A Fertig, Angela R. %K depression %K household finance %K Mental Health %K retirement savings %K Social Security %X Summary The questionable ability of the U.S. pension system to provide for the growing elderly population combined with the rising number of people affected by depression and other mental health issues magnifies the need to understand how these household characteristics affect retirement. Mental health problems have a large and significant negative effect on retirement savings. Specifically, psychological distress is associated with decreasing the probability of holding retirement accounts by as much as 24 percentage points and decreasing retirement savings as a share of financial assets by as much as 67 percentage points. The magnitude of these effects underscores the importance of employer management policy and government regulation of these accounts to help ensure households have adequate retirement savings. %B Health Economics %V 27 %P 404-425 %G eng %U https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/hec.3579 %R https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3579 %0 Report %D 2017 %T The Mortality Effects of Retirement: Evidence from Social Security Eligibility at Age 62 %A Maria D Fitzpatrick %A Moore, Timothy %K Mortality %K Population Health %K Social Security %X Social Security eligibility begins at age 62, and approximately one third of Americans immediately claim at that age. We examine whether age 62 is associated with a discontinuous change in aggregate mortality, a key measure of population health. Using mortality data that covers the entire U.S. population and includes exact dates of birth and death, we document a robust two percent increase in male mortality immediately after age 62. The change in female mortality is smaller and imprecisely estimated. Additional analysis suggests that the increase in male mortality is connected to retirement from the labor force and associated lifestyle changes. %B NBER Working Paper Series %I National Bureau of Economic Research %C Cambridge, MA %G eng %U http://www.nber.org/papers/w24127.pdf %R 10.3386/w24127 %0 Journal Article %J International Journal of Manpower %D 2017 %T To claim or to retire: The social security claiming decision of employed and unemployed workers %A Fawaz, Yarine %K Employment and Labor Force %K Social Security %X Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use the Health and Retirement Study to examine the social security (SS) claiming decision of older Americans, with a focus on the behavior of the unemployed. Design/methodology/approach Using a duration model first, and a bivariate probit framework then, the author investigates whether older unemployed individuals lacking liquidity use SS benefits as a safety net in order to finance consumption during an unemployment episode, even if they do not retire at the same time. In this way, SS might be thought as a form of unemployment insurance (UI) which would allow them to maintain their standard of living during their job search. Findings The author finds evidence of a claiming pattern specific to the unemployed: they claim sooner than full-time workers, even when they do not retire at the same time. They also seem to discontinue this behavior when their access to UI is extended, which gives support to the author’s hypothesis that the unemployed workers, who lack liquidity, claim their SS benefits even if they do not wish to retire, as a source of alternative unemployment benefits. Originality/value By focusing on the SS claiming behavior of the unemployed rather than on their retirement patterns, this paper sheds light on the social insurance role of SS retirement benefits for unemployed workers who are not willing to retire, but need a new source of income while they continue looking for a job. %B International Journal of Manpower %V 38 %P 392-416 %8 May-06-2017 %G eng %U http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/IJM-08-2015-0127 %N 3 %! Int J of Manpower %R 10.1108/IJM-08-2015-0127 %0 Journal Article %J American Journal of Health Economics %D 2015 %T The Impact of Social Security Income on Cognitive Function at Older Ages %A Padmaja Ayyagari %A Frisvold, David %K Cognition %K cognitive function %K Social Security %K Social Security Benefits %X Prior literature has documented a positive association between income and cognitive function at older ages, however, the extent to which this association represents causal effects is unknown. In this study, we use an exogenous change in Social Security income due to amendments to the Social Security Act in the 1970s to identify the causal impact of Social Security income on cognitive function of elderly individuals. We find that higher benefits led to significant improvements in cognitive function and that these improvements in cognition were clinically meaningful. Our results suggest that interventions even at advanced ages can slow the rate of decline in cognitive function. %B American Journal of Health Economics %G eng %U http://www.nber.org/papers/w21484 %R 10.3386/w21484 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Dynamics %D 2013 %T The effect of social security, health, demography and technology on retirement %A Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti %A dos Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues %K Demographics %K Employment and Labor Force %K Health Conditions and Status %K Medicare/Medicaid/Health Insurance %K Retirement Planning and Satisfaction %K Social Security %X This article studies the determinants of the labor force participation of the elderly and investigates the factors that may account for the increase in retirement in the second half of the last century. We develop a lifecycle general equilibrium model with endogenous retirement that embeds Social Security legislation and Medicare. Individuals are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for leisure and face uncertainty about labor productivity, health status and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000 and is able to reproduce very closely the retirement behavior of the American population. It reproduces the peaks in the distribution of Social Security applications at ages 62 and 65 and the observed facts that low earners and unhealthy individuals retire earlier. It also matches very closely the increase in retirement from 1950 to 2000. Changes in Social Security policy which became much more generous and the introduction of Medicare account for most of the expansion of retirement. In contrast, the isolated impact of the increase in longevity was a delaying of retirement. %B Review of Economic Dynamics %I 16 %V 16 %P 350-370 %G eng %U http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202513000057 %N 2 %4 Retirement planning/labor Force Participation/Social security/health Status/Health shocks/Medicare/Aging population %$ 69320 %R http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2013.01.003 %0 Thesis %D 2012 %T Dynamic Models of Labor Supply and Retirement %A Fan, Xiaodong %Y John Kennan %K Employment and Labor Force %K Methodology %K Net Worth and Assets %K Other %K Retirement Planning and Satisfaction %K Social Security %X This dissertation contains three separate essays on the dynamic models of labor supply and retirement. The first essay documents "sharp retirement"--retirement accompanied by a discontinuous decline in labor supply--across three data sets, which previous literature found difficult to explain. I propose and estimate a life-cycle labor supply model with habit persistence wherein sharp retirement can be explained by workers quitting "cold turkey." In much the same way that one might quit smoking, workers with accumulated "working habit" exit the labor force with a pronounced, discontinuous decline in labor supply. The working habit model is consistent with the data, where workers reduce yearly labor supply by scaling back more in hours worked per week (over 50% reduction) than in weeks worked per year (20% reduction). The fixed costs approach, which has been the standard model used to understand sharp retirement, cannot explain these trends. After estimating the model, counterfactuals show that reducing Social Security benefits by 20% causes individuals work an additional 8.6 months. Individuals choosing sharp retirement respond mostly on the extensive margin by delaying retirement eight months, while individuals choosing smooth retirement respond mostly on the intensive margin by increasing yearly labor supply and delaying retirement only one month. The second essay develops and estimates a Ben-Porath human capital model in which individuals make decisions on consumption, human capital investment, labor supply, and retirement. The model allows both an endogenous wage process (which is typically assumed exogenous in the retirement literature) and an endogenous retirement decision (which is typically assumed exogenous in the human capital literature). This integration is important to obtain unbiased estimates, which are critical for most counterfactual analysis. For instance, when evaluating the effect of increasing the Social Security Normal Retirement Age (NRA) on workers' labor supply and retirement decisions, not only does one have to consider how the policy change affects the retirement decision directly, one also needs to consider how it affects the wage process and therefore affects retirement indirectly. We estimate the model using the Method of Simulated Moments to match the life-cycle profiles of wages and hours from the PSID data. Counterfactuals of delaying NRA and removing Social Security earnings test are conducted. We find significant increases in one individual's human capital investment at old ages, which leads to over 20% increase in the wage profile near retirement. Finally, the third essay tests for asymmetric employer learning in the labor market using a three-period model with a match component of wages. When a worker makes her quit/stay decision in a labor market with three periods, she must consider the signaling effect of her decision in subsequent periods. This breaks down some implications derived from two-period models, which are mostly used in the empirical literature. The unconditional quit rate is not necessarily negatively connected with ability in this three-period asymmetric learning model. I suggest two alternative hypothesis tests for asymmetric employer learning in the model. The first test scrutinizes the negative relationship between conditional quit rates and abilities. The second test examines the evolution of weighted average within-group ability variation. Under this model, the variation should decrease over one worker's career history due to sorting on ability. I use the NLSY79 Work-History data and find evidence of asymmetric employer learning from these tests. %I The University of Wisconsin - Madison %V 3524349 %P 113 %8 2012 %G English %9 Ph.D. %M 1080789429 %4 normal retirement age %$ 69244 %! Dynamic Models of Labor Supply and Retirement %0 Report %D 2010 %T The Effects of Health Insurance and Self-Insurance on Retirement Behavior %A John Bailey Jones %A Eric French %K Employment and Labor Force %K Medicare/Medicaid/Health Insurance %K Retirement Planning and Satisfaction %K Social Security %X This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security on retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that Medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior, and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to Medicare. Half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer-provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk. Raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0.074 years over ages 60-69. In comparison, eliminating two years worth of Social Security benefits increases years of work by 0.076 years. %G eng %4 health Insurance/employment/medicare/social Security/retirement Planning/labor Force Participation %$ 23250 %0 Report %D 2010 %T Work Ability and the Social Insurance Safety Net in the Years Prior to Retirement %A Richard W. Johnson %A Melissa Favreault %A Corina D Mommaerts %K Disabilities %K Employment and Labor Force %K Public Policy %K Social Security %X A patchwork of public programs primarily Social Security Disability Insurance, workers compensation, Supplemental Security Income, and veterans benefits provides income supports to people who are unable to work. Yet, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. This report examines the economic consequences of disability in the years leading to retirement. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, the analysis follows a sample of Americans age 51 to 55 in 1992 and computes their disability status, disability benefit receipt, and income until age 64, just before they qualify for full Social Security retirement benefits. The results underscore the precarious financial state of most people approaching traditional retirement age with disabilities. Fewer than half of people who meet our disability criteria ever receive disability benefits in their fifties or early sixties. Poverty rates for those who do are more than three times as high after benefit receipt than before disability onset. %I The Urban Institute %G eng %U http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412008_work_ability.pdf?RSSFeed=UI_RetirementandOlderAmericans.xml %4 social Security Disability Insurance/Public Policy/DISABILITY/DISABILITY/workers compensation/workers compensation/Supplemental Security Income/labor Force Participation %$ 25960 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Labor Economics %D 2004 %T The effect of part-time work on wages: Evidence from the Social Security Rules %A Aaronson, Daniel %A Eric French %K Employment and Labor Force %K Older Adults %K Social Security %X This article identifies the part-time wage effect, using hours variation caused by the Social Security rules. We show that work hours and wages drop sharply at ages 62 and 65. We argue that the hours decline causes the wage decline, resulting in a 25 wage penalty for men who cut their work week from 40 to 20 hours. However, we find little evidence for such an effect among women. We also show that models that fail to account for the joint determination of hours and wages will understate the labor supply response to a tax change by about 26 . %B Journal of Labor Economics %I 22 %V 22 %P 329-352 %G eng %N 2 %R 10.1086/381252 %0 Report %D 2003 %T Employment, Social Security, and Future Retirement Outcomes for Single Mothers %A Richard W. Johnson %A Melissa Favreault %A Joshua H. Goldwyn %K Expectations %K Social Security %K Women and Minorities %I Chestnut Hill, MA, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College %G eng %4 Social Security/Women, Working/Retirement Expectations %$ 13352 %0 Book Section %B Social Security and the Family: Addressing Unmet Needs in an Underfunded System %D 2002 %T The Family, Social Security, and the Retirement Decision %A Melissa Favreault %A Richard W. Johnson %E Melissa Favreault %E Sammartino, F. %E Steuerle, C. Eugene %K Adult children %K Social Security %B Social Security and the Family: Addressing Unmet Needs in an Underfunded System %I The Urban Institute Press %C Washington, DC %P 295-329 %G eng %4 Social Security/Family transfers, structure %$ 8660 %! The Family, Social Security, and the Retirement Decision %0 Book Section %B The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform %D 2002 %T Guaranteed Income: SSI and the Well-Being of the Elderly Poor %A Kathleen McGarry %E Feldstein, Martin %E Jeffrey B Liebman %K Demographics %K Methodology %K Public Policy %K Social Security %X It is a well known fact that over the past 40 years Social Security has made a major contribution to reducing the poverty levels of elderly persons. At the same time people are beginning to realize the decline in labor force participation of the near-elderly. This paper examines these two topics, as well as, the elderly population that is not being provided sufficient Social Security compensation. Within this context the authors discuss possible changes in Supplemental Security Income, the elimination of the asset test, increasing unearned income disregards, raising guarantees to the poverty line, using social security income, costs of changes, and the effects on poverty. %B The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago %G eng %U https://www.nber.org/papers/w7574 %4 Elderly/Low Income Groups/Social Security Research/Supplemental Security Income/Public Policy %$ 8532 %! Guaranteed Income: SSI and the Well-Being of the Elderly Poor %0 Report %D 2002 %T Modeling Income in the Near Term: Revised Projections of Retirement Income Through 2020 for the 1931-1960 Birth Cohorts %A Toder, Eric %A Thompson, Lawrence H. %A Melissa Favreault %A Richard W. Johnson %A Perese, Kevin %A Ratcliffe, Caroline %A Karen E. Smith %A Cori E. Uccello %A Timothy A Waidmann %A Berk, Jillian %A Woldemariam, Romina %A Gary T. Burtless %A Claudia R Sahm %A Douglas A. Wolf %K Disabilities %K Net Worth and Assets %K Pensions %K Social Security %X The Division of Policy Evaluation (DPE) of the Social Security Administration (SSA) has entered into two contracts with the Urban Institute to help it develop a new tool for analyzing the distributional consequences of Social Security reform proposals. The first, awarded in 1998, led to the development of Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT), a tool for simulating the retirement incomes of members of the Baby Boom and neighboring cohorts. The second, awarded in 2000, was to expand and improve on the first version of MINT. In all phases of the project, members of the research staff at SSA/DPE collaborated closely with the contractors. The Brookings Institution served as a subcontractor to the Urban Institute under both contracts and the RAND Corporation participated in the development of the initial version of MINT under a separate contract. This report describes the work of the researchers at Urban and Brookings under the second contract. %B Urban Institute Research Report %I The Urban Institute %C Washington, D.C. %G eng %U http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410609_ModelingIncome.pdf %L wp_2002/Toder_etal_ModelingIncome.pdf %4 Earnings and Benefits File/Disability/Disability/Pensions/Wealth %$ 14212 %0 Book Section %B Privatizing Social Security %D 1998 %T Privatizing Social Security: First Round Effects of a Generic Voluntary Privatized U.S. Social Security System %A Alan L Gustman %A Olivia S. Mitchell %A Thomas L. Steinmeier %E Feldstein, M.S. %K Methodology %K Public Policy %K Social Security %B Privatizing Social Security %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago, IL %P 313-57 %G eng %4 Social Security Research/Privatization/Public Policy %$ 8646 %! Privatizing Social Security: First Round Effects of a Generic Voluntary Privatized U.S. Social Security System %0 Journal Article %J EBRI Issue Brief %D 1997 %T Employee benefits, retirement patterns, and implications for increased work life. %A Fronstin, Paul %K Age Factors %K Aged %K Employment %K Female %K Health Benefit Plans, Employee %K Health Status Indicators %K Humans %K Male %K Medicare %K Middle Aged %K Pensions %K Private Sector %K Retirement %K Social Security %K United States %X

This Issue Brief examines why policymakers are concerned about the trend toward early retirement and how it relates to Social Security, Medicare, and employee health and retirement benefits. It reviews the rationale for the effects of economic incentives on early retirement decisions and includes a summary of empirical literature on the retirement process. It presents data on how employee benefits influence workers' expected retirement patterns. Finally, it examines the implications of public policies to reverse early-retirement trends and raise the eligibility age for Social Security and Medicare. An employee Benefit Research Institute/Gallup survey indicates that there is a direct link between a worker's decision to retire early and the availability of retiree health benefits. In 1993, 61 percent of workers reported that they would not retire before becoming eligible for Medicare if their employer did not provide retiree health benefits. Participation in a pension plan can be an important determinant of retirement. Twenty-one percent of pension plan participants planned to stop working before age 65, compared with 12 percent among nonparticipants. Workers whose primary pension plan was a defined benefit plan were more likely to expect to stop working before age 65 (23 percent) than workers whose primary plan was a defined contribution plan (18 percent). Expected income replacement rates effect retirement patterns, indicating that as the expected replacement increases, the probability of expecting to stop working before age 65 increases. Twenty-two percent of workers with an expected income replacement rate below 60 percent expected to stop working before age 65, compared with 29 percent for those in the 60-69 percent replacement range, and 30 percent for those in the 70-79 percent replacement range. Workers expecting to receive retiree health insurance are more likely to expect to stop working before age 65 than workers who do not expect to have retiree health insurance. Twenty-one percent of workers with retiree health insurance expected to stop working before age 65, compared with 12 percent of workers not expecting to receive retiree health insurance. The Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program depends on obtaining sufficient revenue from active workers' payroll taxes to fund the benefits received by retired beneficiaries. Funding the program in the past was in large part effortless because of the relatively large number of workers per retiree. Today, funding the program is a greater challenge because the ratio of workers to retirees has fallen. Policymakers have been able to agree that reform of the program is necessary for its survival; however, the debate over options to reform the program is just beginning, and it is likely to be a long time before a consensus emerges.

%B EBRI Issue Brief %I No. 184 %P 1-23 %8 1997 Apr %G eng %U https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10166809 %N 184 %1 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10166809?dopt=Abstract %4 Labor Force/Net Worth/Health Insurance Coverage/Retirement Behavior/Economic Status/Public Policy %$ 8108