%0 Journal Article %J Journal of Pension Economics and Finance %D 2020 %T Why are US men retiring later? %A Wenliang Hou %A Alicia H. Munnell %A Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher %A Yinji Li %K Pension plans %K Retirement Decision %K retirement timing %K Social Security %K structural model %X Over the past two decades, the share of individuals claiming Social Security at the Early Eligibility Age has dropped and the average retirement age has increased. At the same time, Social Security rules have changed substantially, employer-sponsored retirement plans have shifted from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC), health has improved, and mortality has decreased. In theory, all of these changes could lead to a trend toward later claiming. Disentangling the effect of any one change is difficult because they have been occurring simultaneously. This paper uses the Gustman and Steinmeier structural model of retirement timing to investigate which of these changes matter most by simulating their effects on the original cohort (1931–1941) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The predicted behavior is then compared with the actual retirements of the Early Boomer cohort (1948–1953) to see how much of the later cohort's delayed claiming and retirement can be explained by these changes. The Early Boomer cohort was less likely to be fully retired than the HRS cohort at both age 62 (36.7% vs. 44.0%) and age 64 (49.5% vs. 53.9%). The model suggests that the shift from DB toward DC plans was the biggest contributor to these declines, followed by better health. Social Security rules and improvements in mortality played smaller roles. %B Journal of Pension Economics and Finance %V 19 %P 442–457 %G eng %N 3 %R 10.1017/S1474747218000331 %0 Report %D 2017 %T Why Are U.S. Households Claiming Social Security Later? %A Wenliang Hou %A Alicia H. Munnell %A Yinji Li %A Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher %K Social Security %K Social Security Benefits %X Over the past two decades, the share of individuals claiming Social Security at the Early Eligibility Age has dropped, and the average retirement age has increased. At the same time, Social Security rules have changed substantially, employer-sponsored retirement plans have shifted from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC), health has improved, and mortality has decreased. In theory, all of these changes could lead to a trend toward later claiming. Disentangling the effect of any one change is difficult because they have been occurring simultaneously. This paper uses the Gustman and Steinmeier structural model of retirement timing to investigate which of these changes matter most by simulating their effects on the original cohort (1931-1941 birth years) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The predicted behavior is then compared to the actual retirements of the Early Baby Boomer cohort (1948-1953 birth years) to see how much of the later cohort’s delayed claiming and retirement can be explained by these changes. %I Center for Retirement Research at Boston College %G eng %U https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/why-are-u-s-households-claiming-social-security-later/ %0 Report %D 2009 %T Unusual Social Security Claiming Strategies: Costs and Distributional Effects %A Alicia H. Munnell %A Sass, Steven A. %A Golub-Sass, Alex %A Nadia S. Karamcheva %K Social Security %X When to claim Social Security is one of the most important decisions Americans face when approaching retirement. Recently, several unconventional claiming strategies have come to light – “Free Loan,” “Claim and Suspend,” and “Claim Now, Claim More Later” – that have the potential to pay higher lifetime benefits to some individuals, increasing system costs. In the “Free Loan” strategy, an individual can claim benefits at a given age and later repay them and file again, obtaining an increased benefit from the delayed filing. This strategy is equivalent to a “no interest” loan from Social Security and could potentially cost the program as much as $11 billion a year. “Claim and Suspend” allows an individual to claim benefits and then immediately suspend them, either to put his own benefits on hold if he reenters the workforce or to allow his spouse to claim a spousal benefit while he continues to work and earn delayed retirement credits. The potential cost of allowing couples the option of “Claim and Suspend” is about $0.5 billion dollars a year. In the “Claim Now, Claim More Later” strategy, a married individual claims a spousal benefit while delaying claiming his own retired worker benefit in order to build up delayed retirement credits. This option could potentially cost Social Security $10 billion a year. Of the three strategies, “Claim and Suspend” appears to have the clearest policy rationale as it provides an incentive for individuals to work longer. %I Center for Retirement Research at Boston College %G eng %U https://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/unusual-social-security-claiming-strategies-costs-and-distributional-effects/ %0 Report %D 2005 %T How Much Pre-Retirement Income Does Social Security Replace? %A Alicia H. Munnell %A Soto, Mauricio %K Income %K Social Security %X Do today's retirees have sufficient income to meet their needs? One common way to address this question is to determine a household's replacement rate. The replacement rate gauges the extent to which retirement income allows workers to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living. In the U.S. retirement income system, Social Security is the single most important source for most people. It provides a basic level of replacement, upon which individuals can build through additional saving. This brief addresses the question of how much pre-retirement income Social Security replaces for current recipients. Subsequent briefs will provide a more comprehensive evaluation of replacement rates by including income from employer-sponsored pensions, other savings, and housing equity, as well as Social Security. The first section of this brief explains the concept of a replacement rate and discusses how much people need for a comfortable retirement. The second section describes how Social Security replacement rates are constructed for this analysis and then reports results for individuals and households. The final section summarizes the key findings. %B Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Briefs %I Center for Retirement Research at Boston College %C Boston %G eng %U https://crr.bc.edu/briefs/how-much-pre-retirement-income-does-social-security-replace/ %L wp_2005/ib_36.pdf %4 Retirement Incomes/Social Security %$ 15500 %0 Report %D 2005 %T Why Do Women Claim Social Security Benefits So Early? %A Alicia H. Munnell %A Soto, Mauricio %K Adult children %K Employment and Labor Force %K Social Security %K Women and Minorities %X This brief summarizes the incentives facing older women when claiming their Social Security benefits. The analysis shows that single women and married women face very different choices. For most married women, the Social Security benefit structure actually encourages them to grab their benefits as soon as possible. These incentives reinforce the tendency for wives, who are usually younger, to retire when their husbands do. Early claiming may maximize the wife's Social Security wealth, but it also encourages them to stop working, creating a loss of earnings and 401(k) savings and extending the period over which they need support in retirement. %I Boston College, Center for Retirement Research %G eng %L wp_2005/ib_35.pdf %4 Marital Status/Women/Social Security/Labor Force Participation %$ 15510