Adverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market

TitleAdverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication1997
AuthorsSloan, FA, Norton, EC
JournalJournal of Risk and Uncertainty
Volume15
Issue3
Pagination201-19
Call Numberpubs_1997_Sloan_FJRiskUncert.pdf
KeywordsConsumption and Savings, Demographics, Health Conditions and Status, Healthcare, Insurance, Methodology
Abstract

Adverse selection, moral hazard and crowding out by public insurance have all been proposed as theoretical reasons for why the market for private long -term care insurance has been slow to evolve in the U.S. Using national samples of the elderly and near elderly, this study investigates which is most important. The data contain direct measures of risk aversion, expectations of future nursing home use and living to old age, and the bequest motive. For both groups, we find evidence of adverse selection, and, for the elderly, crowding out of private long-term care insurance by Medicaid. However, we do not find that demand for such insurance is motivated either by bequest or exchange motives.

Notes

ProCite field 3 : Duke U; U NC

URLhttp://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0895-5646
Endnote Keywords

Insurance/Insurance Companies/Analysis of Health Care Markets/Economics of the Elderly/Elderly/Insurance/Nursing/Old Age

Endnote ID

1098

Citation Key6565