State Fiscal Institutions and Empty-Nest Migration: Are Tiebout voters hobbled?

TitleState Fiscal Institutions and Empty-Nest Migration: Are Tiebout voters hobbled?
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2006
AuthorsFarnham, MP, Sevak, P
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume90
Issue3
Pagination407 -427
KeywordsDemographics, Methodology, Public Policy
Abstract

Using the Health and Retirement Study and a national panel of local fiscal data, we test a lifecycle model of Tiebout sorting. On average, cross-state, empty-nest movers-presumed to be out of fiscal equilibrium-experience large fiscal gains in the form of reduced exposure to local school spending and property taxes, while local empty-nest movers experience no fiscal adjustment. We find evidence that within-state fiscal adjustment is constrained by state institutions that limit local discretion. Empty-nest households moving within states with school finance equalization do not engage in Tiebout-consistent fiscal adjustment, while those moving within states lacking school finance equalization adjust substantially. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Notes

Article English

Endnote Keywords

Tiebout hypothesis/taxation/migration/state and local government

Endnote ID

15850

Citation Key7076