Early Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labour Supply Behaviour of Older Americans

TitleEarly Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labour Supply Behaviour of Older Americans
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsBenitez-Silva, H, Heiland, F
JournalApplied Economics
Volume40
Issue23
Pagination2969
Call Numbernewpubs20090908/AppliedEcon.pdf
KeywordsEmployment and Labor Force, Retirement Planning and Satisfaction, Social Security
Abstract

The labour supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67 and the labour force participation of older Americans starts to increase. These incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work, or return to the labour force, to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld. Since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the NRA is reached, benefits received before the NRA can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labour force exit and claiming hazards using data from the Health and Retirement Study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labour force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labour force.

Endnote Keywords

Social Security/Labor Supply/Older workers/Early Retirement

Endnote ID

20160

Citation Key7268
PubMed ID20811509
PubMed Central IDPMC2930823