Early Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply Behavior of Older Americans.

TitleEarly Claiming of Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply Behavior of Older Americans.
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsBenítez-Silva, H, Heiland, F
JournalAppl Econ
Volume40
Issue23
Pagination2969-2985
Date Published2008 Dec 01
ISSN Number0003-6846
Call Numbernewpubs20090908/AppliedEcon.pdf
Abstract

The labor supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, and the labor force participation of Older Americans starts to increase. These incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work, or return to the labor force, to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld. Since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the NRA is reached, benefits received before the NRA can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labor force exit and claiming hazards using data from the Health and Retirement Study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labor force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labor force.

DOI10.1080/00036840600994054
User Guide Notes

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20811509?dopt=Abstract

Endnote Keywords

Social Security/Labor Supply/Older workers/Early Retirement

Endnote ID

20160

Alternate JournalAppl Econ
Citation Key7268
PubMed ID20811509
PubMed Central IDPMC2930823
Grant ListP01 AG022481 / AG / NIA NIH HHS / United States
P01 AG022481-01A1 / AG / NIA NIH HHS / United States