|Title||Moral hazard and long-term care insurance|
|Publication Type||Journal Article|
|Year of Publication||2019|
|Authors||R. Konetzka, T, He, D, Dong, J, Nyman, JA|
|Journal||The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice|
|Keywords||Aging in place, Long-term care insurance, Nursing homes|
In private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard.
|Short Title||Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract|